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ABSTRACT
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and others posit that rapid development requires a 'big push' -- the coordinated
rapid growth of diverse complementary industries, and suggests a role for government in providing
such coordination. We argue that Japan's zaibatsu, or pyramidal business groups, provided this coordination
after the Meiji government failed at the task. We propose that pyramidal business groups are private
sector mechanisms for coordinating and financing 'big push' growth, and that unique historical circumstances
aided their success in prewar Japan. Specifically, Japan uniquely marginalized its feudal elite; withdrew
its hand with a propitious mass privatization that rallied the private sector; marginalized an otherwise
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1  Introduction 
Over sixty years ago, Rosenstein-Rodan proposed a state-coordinated big push to kick-start sustained 
growth.
1 After decades off economists’ radar, the idea resurfaced in a 1989 model by Murphy, Shleifer, 
and Vishny.
2 Their intuition is cleaner: a car factory is scant use in a country without steel mills, oil 
refineries, gas stations, mechanics, roads, or people with disposable income. Economic development 
requires coordinated growth of demand and supply across multiple sectors, as firms in each exploit 
increasing returns to scale – often with firms in one sector bearing losses as another develops. Without 
coordination, growth falters because of a range of market failures.  With coordination, increasing 
economies of scale in each growing industry spillover into growth opportunities in other sectors.
3   
A key problem is that first movers risk “hold-up” problems.
4 “Hold up” occurs when one business’s 
return depends on others’ actions. For example, digging a coal mine next to a planned steel mill exposes 
the mine to a “hold-up” The steel company can demand cut price coal by threatening to walk away, 
leaving the mine without a nearby customer. Each wants the other to move first.
5 Information 
asymmetries and adverse selection problems prevent the two parties from contracting their way out of the 
impasse.  At worst, nothing happens; at best, one or both operate on inefficient scales.  
Vertical integration solves this problem under some circumstances, for if a single company digs the 
mine and builds the steel mill, the problem evaporates.
6  But the problem of coordinating rapid 
development across an entire economy is much knottier.
7 Some goods are complementary, so a creamery 
does little business unless consumers have refrigerators.  Other cross-industry dependencies take the form 
                                                 
1 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, “Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South Eastern Europe,” Economic Journal 53 
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of network externalities – for example, having a phone does a business little good if its suppliers and 
customers lack phones.
8  Financial, legal, and physical infrastructure development, all critical to an 
economy’s ability to support entrepreneurship, share many characteristics of network externalities.
9 
Individuals investment in human capital also has such characteristics.
10  Yet other coordination problems 
turn on having enough consumer demand to achieve economies of scale in production.
11 Rosenstein-
Rodan concludes that integrating all such interdependencies within a single entity is essentially a call for 
central planning, and calls for the state to coordinate and subsidize a massive cross-industry surge of 
capital investment – a big push.   
Rostow defines economic takeoff as the transition from a low-income to a high income growth path; 
and sees big push coordination lifting countries out of a poverty trap.
 12  Kofi Annan’s UN Millennium 
Project and Sachs’ shock therapy both echo Rosenstein-Rodan’s call for a big push to bring developing 
countries to Rostow’s economic takeoff.
13  
But despite past big push efforts a growing income gap separates rich from poor countries.
14 Easterly 
despairs of big push plans because they provoke government failures.
15 Bauer argues that development 
depends on individual freedom, and that burdensome government causes poverty traps
16. Hayek criticizes 
                                                 
8 See Shmuel S. Oren, Stephen A. Smith, and Robert B. Wilson, “Nonlinear Pricing in Markets with Interdependent 
Demand,” Marketing Science 1 (1982) 287-313.   
9 William Bygrave and Maria Minniti, “Social dynamics of entrepreneurship,” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 24 
(2000) 25-38.    
10 Gary Becker, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert Tamura, “Human Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth” Journal of 
Political Economy 98 (1990)  512-37.   
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Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989) 537-65. 
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low income countries, challenged by high rates of rural poverty and illiteracy. See Prakash Loungani, “Inequality,” Finance & 
Development 40, no. 3 (2003): 22. 
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Rosenstein-Rodan specifically, stressing that governments lack the detailed information needed to 
coordinate a big push.
17 Kornai adds that state subsidies distort investments by softening budget 
constraints.
18 Krueger argues that extensive government intervention magnifies returns to political rent 
seeking, deepening poverty traps.
19 Baumol and Murphy et al. explain how high political rent-seeking 
returns divert entrepreneurs from the positive externality investments needed for a successful big push.
20 
Easterly’s growing gap highlights a deep inconsistency if the very state intervention needed to coordinate 
a big push undermines it.  
The only successful big push Easterly concedes is Meiji Japan.
21 We therefore investigate this 
success, and find it to be an informative anomaly. In the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, Japan’s Meiji 
government organized a big push, much like that advocated by the UN Millennium Project. In the late 
19
th century, the government capitalized and subsidized numerous state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but 
government failure problems soon triggered a fiscal crisis. To restore public finances, Japan conducted a 
mass privatization as the 19
th century drew to a close. Wealthy families and entrepreneurs assembled 
former SOEs into zaibatsu, large diversified pyramidal groups of listed firms. Japan then entered its high 
growth era and Rostow estimates its economic takeoff as complete perhaps by 1900, 1914 at the latest.
22  
  Highly industrially diversified business groups, of which zaibatsu  are typical examples, are 
ubiquitous in developing economies.
23 We propose they are mechanisms for private sector coordination of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nicolson, 1972) and Peter Thomas Bauer, Reality and Rhetoric: Studies in the Economics of Development (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1984).  
17 Friedrich Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945): 519-30. 
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seeking Costly to Growth?” American Economic Review 82 (1993): 409-414. 
21 Others, notably Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin Press, 
2005), see ‘big push’ growth as critical in the economic histories of other developed economies too.  Yet others stress Japan’s 
mid 20
th century growth as state directed; however this is the reconstruction of an industrial economy destroyed by war, not a big 
push in the sense of Rosenstein-Rodan. Also, econometric evidence disputes positive role of state planning in postwar Japanese 
reconstruction; see e.g. Richard Beason and David E. Weinstein, “Growth, Economies of Scale, and Targeting in Japan (1955-
1990),” Review of Economics and Statistics 78, no. 2 (1996): 286-295.  
22 W.W. Rostow, “The Takeoff into Self-Sustained Growth,” Economic Journal 66, no. 261 (1956): 25-48.  
  
23 Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh. “Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?” Journal of Economic 
Literature (2007 forthcoming) document the extensive industrial diversification of typical business groups at length; Tarun 
Khanna and J. Rivkin, “Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups in Emerging Markets,” Strategic Management   5
a big push growth via “tunneling” – transferring wealth from one group firm to another.
24 With tunneling 
coordinating growth across industries and a controlling shareholder preventing hold ups, business groups 
provide an alternative to a state-orchestrated big push. 
25  We concede that the generality of our arguments 
remains speculative, and call for further research on Japan and other countries. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews relevant literature on business groups. 
Section 3 describes Japan’s Meiji “shock therapy” marginalizing traditional elites. Section 4 describes the 
state-initiated big push, fiscal crisis, and mass privatization. Section 5 describe zaibatsu-led big push and 
the subsequent marginalization of their controlling shareholders. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Previous Work on Business Groups 
We are not proposing an alternative hypothesis to other economic explanations of business groups. 
Rather, we seek to synthesize competing hypotheses into a single overarching explanation. Thus, rather 
than test our thesis against alternative hypotheses, we draw on previous results to show that apparently 
clashing explanations and evidence coalesce into our thesis, yet retain their individual validity.
26  Thus, 
much of what we say is not new.     
Our thesis accords with Ohkawa and Rosovsky, who see zaibatsu as foreign technology importers.
27 
Their evidence matches our thesis, for a big push coordinates new technology investment across 
complementary industries. Indeed, without specifically mentioning the big push literature, their wording 
resonates: “[t]he most famous zaibatsu [were] based on the rapid industrialization that had occurred in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Journal 22, no. 1 (2001): 45-74. 
24 For detailed methodology, see M.P. Bertrand, P. Mehra and S. Mullainathan, “Ferreting out tunneling: an application to 
Indian business groups.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002): 121-148.  For a survey, see Randall Morck, Daniel 
Wolfenzon and Bernard Yeung, “Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth,” Journal of Economics Literature 
43 (2005): 657-722 and others.  
25 Masahiko Aoki, Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 223 documents such coordination, writing that zaibatsu implement “centralized coordination” as “[t]he general 
trading company acted as a sole trading agent for member firms and was in a position to manipulate the terms of transaction with 
outsiders. The holding company pooled the profits of the operating firms.” He adds that “post-World War groups of companies - 
those of zaibatsu origin or those clustered around the principal banks - do not operate under such centralized coordination.”  
26 For recent surveys, see Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon and Bernard Yeung, “Corporate Governance, Economic 
Entrenchment and Growth,” Journal of Economics Literature 43 (2005): 657-722 and Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh, 
“Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?” Journal of Economic Literature (2007.forthcoming).  
27 Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the Twentieth Century 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973)    6
first two decades of this century. Although it is difficult to generalize, perhaps, one can say that in the 
nineteenth century commerce was the major activity of zaibatsu; around World War I it was industry with 
particular emphasis on coal mining, shipbuilding, engineering, and glass; and in the 1920's, it became 
sophisticated industries."
28 Detailed industry-by-industry analysis of this shifting emphasis, though 
beyond our present scope, might accord with a big push.  
Khanna and Yafeh propose coinsurance as a major purpose of business groups.
29 Using Japanese data, 
they show zaibatsu firms sharing risks in 1932-1943, though not necessarily in earlier periods. Examining 
data for 1921-1927 and 1933-37, Miyajima detects no such risk sharing, instead suggesting zaibatsu 
controlling shareholders monitor group firms’ capital investment.
30 Our argument accords with both, 
clarifying the nature of key risks (hold up problems) and why a single controlling shareholder monitors 
firms in diverse industries (big push coordination).    
Khanna and Palepu and others argue that business groups substitute for corrupt capital, labor, and 
product markets.
31 They find group firms outperforming freestanding firms in corrupt economies, 
explaining that group firms can safely deal with other firms in the same group while freestanding firms 
risk being cheated at every turn. The market failures we stress are similar. Central coordination facilitates 
a big push by sidestepping hold-up problems and coordinating growth across industries. Given an 
efficient legal system, contracts between independent firms might substitute for a common controlling 
shareholder under some circumstances.
32  Certainly, a greater centralization of control is plausibly needed 
                                                 
28 Ibid. pp. 219-21. See also W.W. Lockwood, Economic Development of Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1954), 227 and Shigeaki Yasuoka, Japanese zaibatsu (Nihonno zaibatsu) (Tokyo: Nikkei, 1976) who writes: “that diversified 
businesses arise from the very beginning of the industrialization of under-developed countries when such countries contact with 
advanced capitalism, because under-developed countries undertake modernization or industrialization of all industrial sectors.” 
Note however, that pyramidal business groups are radically different from diversified single firms. Explaining the advantages of 
diversification does not explain the ubiquity of pyramidal business groups.  
29 Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh, “Business Groups and Risk Sharing Around the World,” Journal of Business 78, no. 1 
(2005): 301-340. 
30 H. Miyajima, Economic history of industrial policy and corporate governance: micro analysis of Japanese economic 
development (in Japanese) (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2004). 
31 Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, “Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance,” 
in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, ed. Randall Morck (National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Volume, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), Tarun Khanna and J. Rivkin, “Estimating the Performance Effects of Business 
Groups in Emerging Markets,” Strategic Management Journal 22, no. 1 (2001), Tarun Khanna and Raymond Fisman, 
“Facilitating Development: The Role of Business Groups,” World Development 32, no. 4 (2004): 609-628.  
32On the importance of law to modern corporations, see La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, 
Robert W. Vishny. “Legal determinants of external finance.” Journal of Finance 52, no. 3 (1997a): 1131-1150.   7
to achieve a big push where corruption is rifer.  
Yafeh captures part of our thesis, arguing that vertically integrated keiretsu in postwar Japan, wherein 
a major firm like Toyota holds control blocks in listed supplier and customer firms, arose to limit hold-up 
problems.
33 We elevate Yafeh’s insight into a broader theory of pyramidal business groups as major 
players in big push growth.  Even closer to our argument, Khanna and Yafeh refer to zaibatsu helping the 
government coordinate a big push. But ours differs fundamentally, for we see zaibatsu taking command 
of a big push that was failing under state leadership.
34   
Much work stresses tunneling, the controlling shareholder siphoning wealth from listed group firms 
to benefit himself, as a primary raison d’être for business groups.
35 Our thesis accords with this too. 
Coordinating a big push requires the massive tapping of national savings, so group firms need public 
shareholders. It also requires group firms in some industries to subsidize those in other industries, and to 
forsake hold-up opportunities. Their shareholders would understandably perceive this as tunneling and as 
poor governance. An undisputed controlling shareholder is needed to overrule them so the big push can 
proceed. Thus, evidence of tunneling between group firms accords with our thesis.  
One objection to this reasoning is that extensive tunneling deters the public from buying group firms’ 
shares. However, this misapprehends agency theory. Rational shareholders forecast tunneling losses and 
discount share prices accordingly. At low enough prices, they buy and earn equilibrium risk-adjusted 
returns. Expected tunneling reduces insiders’ proceeds from floating a set fraction of a firm’s shares, and 
its cost, like all expected agency costs, falls on the initial owners at the initial public offering (IPO).
36 
Expected tunneling raises firms’ costs of tapping public equity, but does not ‘exploit’ public shareholders.  
But a large literature portrays a dark side to pyramidal groups. Berle and Means fear extreme 
                                                 
33 Yishay Yafeh, “Japan’s Corporate Groups: Some International and Historical Perspectives,” in M. Blomström, J. Corbett, 
F. Hayashi and A. Kashyap (eds.) Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
34 Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh. “Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?” Journal of Economic 
Literature (2007 forthcoming) argue that K. Ohkawa. and H. Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the 
Twentieth Century (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1973) advance this thesis.. 
35 Surveyed in Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon and Bernard Yeung, “Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment 
and Growth,” Journal of Economics Literature 43 (2005): 657-722.  
36 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, “The Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure.”  Journal of Financial Economics. 3 (1976) 305-360.   8
governance abuses in pyramidal groups.
37 This may explain why the United States forcibly dismantled its 
business groups in the 1930s, the London Stock Exchange did likewise in the 1970s; and Korea seems 
intent on curbing its chaebol.
38 Haber argues that aging tycoons and the heirs to great business families 
often undermine sustained growth.
39 Once wealthy, they see a dynamic and consequently unstable 
economy as threatening a status quo they enjoy.
40 Others suggest untalented, but well-connected heirs to 
old-money pyramids find political rent-seeking their highest value investment.
 41 This could retard growth 
as effectively as government failures in a state-run big push.
42  
This dark side to pyramidal groups seems initially to contradict our thesis. But the dark side 
characterizes business groups controlled by geriatric tycoons or inadequate heirs; not the highly talented 
controlling shareholders of the other discussions. Big pushes generally fail, and a natural progression 
from entrepreneurial controlling shareholders to entrenched heirs might convert growth-promoting 
                                                 
37 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. (New York: Macmillan, 1932); Lucien 
Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman, and George Triantis, “Stock Pyramids, Cross Ownership and Dual Class equity: The Mechanisms 
and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights,” in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, ed. Randall Morck 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Volume. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Randall Morck, 
David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung, “Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease,” 
in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, ed. Randall Morck (National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Volume. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).  
38 Re. the US, see Randall Morck, “How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double-Taxation of Intercorporate 
Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, ed. James Poterba (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2005a); re. the UK see Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, “Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of 
Family Ownership in the United Kingdom,” in A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups 
to Professional Managers, ed. Randall Morck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), and re. Korea see Phil-Sang Lee, 
“Economic Crisis and Chaebol Reform in Korea,” discussion paper no. 14 (School of Business Administration, Korea University, 
2000).  
39 Stephen Haber, Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America: Essays in Policy, History, and Political 
Economy (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000); Stephen Haber, Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: 
Theory and Evidence (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2002). 
40 Mancur Olson, Jr. “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force,” Journal of Economic History 23, no. 4 (1963): 529-552; 
Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon and Bernard Yeung, “Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth,” Journal 
of Economics Literature 43 (2005): 657-722.  
41 Randall Morck, David A. Stangeland, and Bernard Yeung, “Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth: 
The Canadian Disease,” in Concentrated Corporate Ownership, ed. Randall Morck (National Bureau of Economic Research 
Conference Volume. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Family Control and the 
Rent-Seeking Society,” Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 19 (2004): 391-409; Kathy Fogel, “Oligarchic family control, 
social economic outcomes, and the quality of government,” Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006): 603–622; 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, “The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 69, no. 1 (2003): 5-50; Anne Krueger, “Why Crony Capitalism is Bad for Economic Growth,” in 
Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: Theory and Evidence, ed. Stephen Haber (Hoover Institution Press, 
2002); Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society,” Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice 19 (2004); Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Agency problems in large family business groups,” Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice 27, no. 4 (2003). . 
42 Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (May 1991): 503-530; Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “Why is Rent-seeking Costly 
to Growth?” American Economic Review 82, no. 2 (1993): 409-414; Anne Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking 
Society.” American Economic Review 64 (1974): 291-303.    9
pyramids into growth-blocking artifacts.  
If so, we must explain Japan’s oddly successful big push. To do this, we show this progression failing 
in Japan because of uniquely sweeping early shock therapy marginalizing the feudal elite, a fiscal crisis 
draining bureaucratic power, and military governments (Japanese and American) marginalizing zaibatsu 
families.  We also argue that Meiji Japan’s so-called “unequal treaties”, even when renegotiated, limited 
trade and investment barriers. Openness checks elites’ power, and thus the downsides of pyramidal 
groups.
43 The unequal treaties gave foreign courts jurisdiction in concession enclaves, providing Japanese 
unobstructed views of foreign jurisprudence, likely helping Japan implement an effective legal system – 
which further limits these downsides.
44 Openness also lets imports and exports, as well as foreign capital, 
compensate for missing or misscaled parts of the domestic economy as a big push builds.
45  Japan’s 
propitious timing and persistent openness may thus highlight conditions for successful big pushes that 
might be deliberately imposed elsewhere.  
Finally, we reiterate that we in no way challenge the validity of other explanations of business groups.  
Rather, we seek to reconcile them as consistent with business groups orchestrating big push growth.  We 
further acknowledge that our big push thesis need not fully subsume the above hypotheses, which may 
well retain independent validity entirely independent of big push growth.    
 
3.  Shock Therapy 
Before its big push, Japan underwent sweeping institutional renewal that uniquely marginalized 
traditional elites. Unique in depth and scope, this ‘shock therapy’ may well explain Japan’s ultimately 
                                                 
43 Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, “The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 69, no. 1 (2003): 5-50 show Japan relatively open in 1913 – see esp. Table 3.  For more general 
discussion of these points, see Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales. Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2003).   
44 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W Vishny, “Trust in large organizations,” American 
Economic Review 87, no. 2 (1997), 333-338. 
45 See e.g. Vitor Trindade, “The big push, industrialization and international trade: The role of exports” Journal of 
Development Economics 78 (2005) 22– 48.  *   10
successful ‘big push’ and the failures of analogous efforts elsewhere.
46   
 
3.1  The Shocking Truth 
Prior to the arrival of Admiral Perry’s warships in 1854, Japan was remarkably isolated, with foreigners 
subject to instant death outside a tiny enclave in Nagasaki. The Tokugawa Shoguns, who ruled Japan 
from 1603 to 1868, preserved a rigidly stratified society. The elite were samurai – an hereditary caste of 
warriors with the power of life and death over their inferiors. The lesser castes were peasants, tradesmen 
below them, and merchants lowest of all. An intricate code of warrior ethics, bushido, forbade class 
mobility and enshrined samurai rule. That foreigners sought the company of merchants was an affront.  
  The shogunate, nonetheless, needed merchants – for samurai need weapons and taxpayers. Two great 
families, the Mitsui and Sumitomo, arose to such prominence as merchants might attain.  
The Mitsui traded silk. Since money was not in general use, they ran a sophisticated barter operation 
– a general trading business. This operation, spanning Japan, was recruited by the Shogunate for tax 
farming, further enriching the Mitsui. The Sumitomo owned mines and supplied metal for weapons. Both 
silk finery and metals also bought curiosities and weapons from the barbarians confined in Nagasaki. 
Other Tokugawa merchant families were important in Japan, but only the Mitsui and Sumitomo survive 
Japan’s transition to play important roles in its big push.  
Both families managed without money and modern economic institutions, like corporation or contract 
law. Consequently, both families developed house rules – constitutions dictating how business should be 
done; profits calculated, allocated, and disbursed; and power passed from generation to generation. House 
rules assigned key decisions to family councils – parliaments representing clans according to precise 
voting formulae. Thus, in an environment without ambient business law, merchant houses formulated 
their own laws and, as far as we can tell, adhered to them rigidly. Private legal systems served both 
merchant houses well, making their behavior predictable and their promises credible. The Mitsui and 
                                                 
46 See William Easterly, “The Big Push Deja Vu: A Review of Jeffrey Sach's The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities 
for Our Time,” Journal of Economic Literature 44, no. 1 (2006): 1, and cites therein.   11
Sumitomo became preferred business partners for economic actors of all kinds, including the Shogunate.  
In 1853, the United States dispatched about one-fourth of its navy to Japan.
47 Their humanitarian 
goal, lifting the death penalty on foreigners shipwrecked off Japan, veiled a commercial mission – 
opening Japan to American traders. The commander, Admiral Matthew Perry, sailed into Tokyo Bay in 
violation of Japanese law, presented Tokugawa officials a draft trade treaty, and continued on to China. 
The following year he returned with a larger fleet and, under American cannon, the Shogunate signed the 
Convention of Kanagawa, which protected shipwrecked sailors, let U.S. ships buy coal, and opened 
Shimoda and Hakodate to American traders.  
  Japan’s accession to the Victorian global economy was formalized with the 1858 Treaty of Amity and 
Commerce. This U.S.-imposed treaty opened Tokyo, Kobe, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Yokohama to 
American trade, fixed low tariffs, and gave consular courts extraterritorial jurisdiction over “concession” 
areas in those ports. Similar treaties with the Britain and other Western powers soon followed.  
Japan was thus suddenly flung open to free trade and foreign investment in the concessions. These 
agreements were denigrated in Japan as unequal treaties because they enforced no similar concessions for 
Japanese in foreign countries, and were renegotiated in 1899. Tariffs rose very slightly, but foreign 
companies could now operate throughout Japan. General Electric, Western Electric, Vickers Armstrong, 
and other major firms starred in a large-scale foreign direct investment inflow that continued until 1930.
48  
Japan remained open to foreign trade and investment openness until the Great Depression.
49 Japan’s 
Tokugawa rulers realized that globalization required domestic reforms, and from 1899 on, taxed industry 
more lightly than agriculture.
50 But comprehensive liberalization proved beyond their abilities. 
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3.2   Shock Therapy 
This backdrop perhaps explains the subsequent political tsunami. In 1868, a band of young samurai 
overthrew the craven Tokugawa shoguns. With the Meiji emperor, previously relegated to ceremonial 
duties, as their figurehead; these zealous warriors launched the Meiji Restoration.
51 Their coup triggered 
perhaps the deepest transformation ever effected on a major economy.  
The regime dispatched young Japanese abroad to study science, law, economics, engineering, and 
every other field relevant to modernization – and then report home. The knowledge these emissaries 
brought back frightened the Meiji rulers, who resolved to restore Japan its rightful place in the world. The 
modernization they implemented was unparalleled until the post-socialist reconstructions of the 1990s in 
Eastern Europe. The term shock therapy, coined in that context by Sachs seems appropriate here as well.
52 
Meiji shock therapy, like its late 20
th century analogs, launched comprehensive reforms across all 
aspects of the economy nearly simultaneously. Within a few years, Japan adopted parliamentary 
democracy modeled on the German Diet, compulsory public education modeled on French and German 
schools, universities and a modern military fashioned after those of Prussia, and a fleet modeled on the 
Royal Navy. Religious freedom, social mobility, and land reform became official policy.  
Most pertinently, the reformers imposed 19
th century liberal capitalism. Finding hereditary casts and 
warrior ethics hopelessly fusty; they abolished all feudal ranks and privileges in 1871.
53 The feudal 
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system bound society together, so new glue was needed. Modifying the German Civil Code in stages, and 
with grafts from other legal models, Japan rapidly built a state-of-the-art late 19
th century legal system. 
Regulations permitting public bond trading arrived in the early 1870s, and an 1878 Stock Exchange 
Ordinance opened the way for equity markets in Tokyo and Osaka. By 1888, Japan’s Civil Code was 
fully as sophisticated as its German prototype.  
  
3.3.   Aftershock 
Under the new code, merchant houses were suddenly general partnerships subject to previously unknown 
constellations of laws that overrode house rules and family councils.  Adaptation proved beyond the 
capabilities of some merchant houses, and severely strained others. Mitsui and Sumitomo survived, but 
navigating the aftershocks was simple for neither. Both modernized by adopting Western technology – 
textiles manufacture and mining technologies, respectively – and by supplementing general trading with 
banking as money gained acceptance.  
But institutional change proved harder than technological change. The legal system created 
previously unheard of liabilities, so many merchant families incorporated to obtain limited liability. But 
this created more problems, for they now found squabbling relatives claiming rights that never obtained 
under the ancient house rules. Even worse, rewards traditionally bestowed on successful hired managers 
turned out to be shares with voting rights. In short, new institutions undermined traditional norms, 
creating uncertainty around previously clear business dealings.  
Hired managers holding shares proved unbearable, and many old families went to great lengths to 
rectify the situation. Mitsui Bank, founded in 1876, found itself with over 400 manager-shareholders and 
reorganized in 1893 to buy them all out. Other merchant families also bared their coffers buying back 
shares from hired managers. These buyouts alienated outsiders by underscoring their inferior status.  
                                                                                                                                                             
1876 were entirely commuted into relatively small lump-sum payments of cash or government bonds. Thus the samurai in a brief 
nine-year period were deprived of all their privileges, and Japan was started on a great change that was to transform its society in 
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Loyal hired managers holding shares were intolerable, but outside shareholders were unadulterated 
outrage. A few merchant families, notably the Shimomura and Ohmura, financed growth with public 
equity and lost control to outsiders. Others therefore remained unlisted and dependent on internal funds. 
This curtailed their growth, and explains the eclipse of many Tokugawa merchant dynasties.  
  Into this void stepped a new generation of entrepreneurs without Tokugawa roots. Yataro Iwasaki 
(1834-1885) organized Mitsubishi around a state-subsidized shipping monopoly. Mitsubishi probably had 
a genuine business advantage, for Iwasaki instituted modern accounting before his rivals.
54 But its main 
advantage was government favors. The government wanted Japan to be a maritime power, and Iwasaki 
stepped forward to help. From 1875 on, his Yubin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha shipping company received 
¥250,000 annually for carrying government mail. This subsidy protected Mitsubishi from foreign 
competition. Quickly acquiring 37 seafaring ships, Mitsubishi soon carried most of Japan’s foreign trade. 
More subsidies flowed through the state-owned Nagasaki Shipyard, which lost money repairing and 
maintaining Mitsubishi ships – probably at cut rates. Iwasaki plowed his rapidly rising earnings into 
capital investment, and Mitsubishi grew rapidly to rival Mitsui and Sumitomo.  
 
4.  The State’s Big Push 
Japan’s shock therapy aimed to build modern munitions plants, shipyards, and the like. Although Mitsui 
and Sumitomo embraced new technology for spinning silk or refining copper, and supplemented their 
trading operations with banking; they remained cool towards utterly new industries. This perhaps 
reflected a realistic assessment of their expertise; but building new business plainly required outside 
capital and neither family dared risk joining the Shimomura and Ohmura in economic oblivion. And 
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though Mitsubishi grew rapidly, it too lacked expertise outside shipping and related businesses.  
Government prodding of merchant families to pool capital met determined resistance. The state 
exhorted many families into jointly capitalizing banks in the 1870s, but interfamilial squabbling paralyzed 
governance and each family soon established its own bank. The Mitsui thus abandoned the First National 
Bank, co-founded with the Ono and other families, to establish Mitsui Bank in 1876. More prodding to 
pool their capital and develop new industries seemed a poor plan.  
 
4.1   State-Owned Enterprises 
Instead, SOEs would build new industries essential to modernization. More SOEs would be needed to 
provide inputs to the first set, and still more to build railroads and other infrastructure. The new strategy 
quickly developed into a big push as SOEs materialized in one modern industry after another.
55  
This effort was massive. From 1868 to 1885, the Industry, Interior, and Agriculture Ministries 
“special subsidy funds” of ¥52.9, ¥4.6, and ¥9.6 million total ¥69.3 million for SOE operating deficits, 
frontier development initiatives, and targeted loans. Adding the ministries’ operating costs – ¥15.4, ¥3.1, 
and ¥18.1 million, respectively – totals ¥42.4 million, bringing the grand total to ¥111.7 million per year. 
Separate accounts for new SOEs, an investment capital trust fund, and other programs total ¥16.1 million. 
Finally, prefecture industrial promotion grants total ¥1.6 million. All told, subsidies and their 
administration cost ¥127.83 million from 1868 to 1885. Given Japan's national income – ¥397 million in 
1878, the first year of data – these sums are huge for the era.
56  
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The Industry Ministry oversaw mining, railways, civil engineering, telegraphy, navigation, 
shipbuilding, iron production, and manufacturing; and all SOEs therein. The greater parts of its 
investment flowed into state-owned railways and mines – 47.9% and 31.5%, respectively. Lesser amounts 
financed SOEs in telegraphy (12.3%) and manufacturing (8.3%).  
The ministry expected its gold and silver mines to generate revenue. It operated ten large mines 
directly, and leased the management of others to private contractors. But Japan’s only modern colliery, 
the Takashima mine near Nagasaki, was Dutch-owned, albeit with Japanese partners.
57  This 
embarrassed the government, and the state bought the Takashima mine for $400,000 in 1874. 
Many thought this ridiculously generous and accused the government variously of bribing 
foreigners or bargaining ineptly.  
Japan needed railroads to transport goods, but also to build Japan’s regions into a nation. The ministry 
thus emphasized linking interior regions to ports. The same nation-building agenda charged the ministry 
with modernizing Hokkaido, spotting the undeveloped territory with cotton and sugar mills, breweries, 
creameries, canneries, and other SOEs.  
The Interior Ministry oversaw commerce, vital statistics, the post, cartography, surveys, and policing. 
It had budgets for civil engineering projects and SOEs. Its SOE subsidies went 29.0% to agricultural 
products, 28.6% to dairy products, 28.2% to cotton textiles, 8.6% to silk, and 2.0% to experimental farms; 
with lesser amounts to forestry, crafts and commerce, and maritime shipping.  
Its control over policing and other regional matters brought direct involvement in local economies. 
Thus, the ministry financed experimental farms, farm factories, and dairy farms – all on small local 
scales. Its model silk, cotton and other textile, and paper mills, unlike the Industry Ministry’s gargantuan 
SOEs, were not designed to force industrialization; but to introduce new technologies that would 
eventually substitute domestic goods for imports. Its policies thus foreshadowed twentieth century 
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“import substitution” theories.
58  
The government also inherited state-owned mines and enterprises the Tokugawa established in their 
final years. Many went to the military – the navy took Yokosuka ironworks, Yokohama ironworks, Uraga 
shipbuilding, and Ishikawajima shipbuilding; and the army Sekiguchi manufacturing. The Sado gold mine 
and Ikuno silver mine fell to the Industry Ministry. Industrial ventures by individual warlords, typically 
with direct military objectives, were also seized when the feudal order was abolished in 1871. Of these, 
the Shikine gun powder plant and Shuseikan manufacturing complex went to the navy; the Takinokami 
gun powder plant and Ogi Chuzou metal casting plant went to the army, a raft of mines and Hyogo 
shipbuilding went to the Ministry of Industry, and the Sakai textiles plant went to the Ministry of Finance.  
However, the most important SOEs were established by the state anew. These include large ventures 
in chemicals, machinery, mining, printing, railways, shipbuilding, telegraphy, and textiles. In mining, the 
Aburato venture was notable. In machinery and chemicals, the government established Akabane 
Seisakusho, Cement Seizosho, Shingawa Glass Seizosho, and Shirorengaishi Seizousho. In textiles, key 
state-established ventures include Tomioka Seishisho, Shinmachi Bousekisho, Senju Seijusho, Aichi 
Bosekisho, and Hiroshima Bosekisho. Although they also established new gold and silver mines, the 
reformers’ hopes that mining revenues could fund modernization were unfulfilled.  
Various branches of government apparently disputed control. Telegraphy and lighthouses ultimately 
fell to the Communications Ministry. Railways ultimately ended up directly run by the Cabinet. The Navy 
and Army controlled munitions and related enterprises. For example, the Navy ran Yokosuka Iron and 
Steel, Yokohama Iron and Steel, Uraga Shipbuilding, and Ishikawajima Shipbuilding.
59  
 
4.2   Government Failure 
To finance its big push, the government seized control of all taxation, abolishing the feudal rice tax and 
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requiring payment in coin from 1873 on. This plus earnings from state-owned mines reduced the state’s 
exposure to agricultural prices. From 1871 through 1875, the government's primary balance (tax revenues 
less ordinary expenditures excluding interest) remained marginally positive.  
But this could not finance thoroughgoing modernization. The state therefore borrowed. Its first bond 
issue raised £1 million at 9% in London in 1870 to finance state railways, with duties and future railway 
profits as collateral. A second London issue in 1873 raised a further £2.4 million at 7% due in 30 years for 
warlords and samurai pensions. These were abruptly terminated in August 1876 – freeing up the funds.
60 
This issue was collateralized by general revenues plus up to 400,000 ton of rice, worth about $16 million 
– slightly more than the annual interest. In total, these two issues netted ¥16 million.  
Japan issued no more foreign debt until the Sino-Japanese War. But the government now appreciated 
the advantages of debt markets over the private (and secret) debts the Tokugawa incurred from merchants. 
From 1872 through 1883, a succession of domestic debt issues to raised ¥292 million – a huge amount.
61  
Their fiscal situation deteriorated sharply in 1877, when suppressing the Seinan Uprising – Japan’s 
last feudal rebellion – cost ¥41.57 million, roughly 70% of the previous year’s budget. The government 
managed the immediate crisis by borrowing ¥15 million and printing ¥27 million in inconvertible paper 
currency.
62 The soaring money supply fuelled inflation, which induced the National banks to quicken 
their presses. Japan was now in an unsustainable inflationary spiral.  The Finance Minister, Masayoshi 
Matsukata, resolved to confront the crisis with a dual reform.  
His monetary reform unified the currency. Previously only coinage was official, and private national 
banks issued banknotes in currencies of their choice. Matsukata created the Bank of Japan in 1886 to 
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issue one official currency, the yen, backed by silver.
63  
His fiscal reform was a general belt tightening, slashing subsidies and raising money by privatizing 
SOEs en masse. The SOEs hemorrhaged money, and Matsukata’s predecessor, Shigenobu Okuma, was 
fired amid a political struggle after proposing a mass privatization in 1880.
64 Matsusaka, finding virtually 
every SOE, save a few mines, a looming fiscal disaster, recognized mass privatization as the only escape 
from economic and political collapse.  
Accepting economic liberalism was inescapable. Initially, this was grudging. Subsidies slowly fell for 
many SOEs, but continued for maritime shipping, railways, and silk. But resistance faded as fiscal crisis 
loomed, and ending all subsidies soon seemed imperative.  
Matsukata initially merely slashed SOE subsidies and shelved plans for new SOEs. This hardened 
SEO budget constraints. As in modern transition economies, this improved governance.
65 From mid-1878 
on, each SOE provided detailed income statements and balance sheets. Remarkably, the state previously 
only tabulated aggregate expenditures and revenues of all SOEs! These reforms had three key effects. 
First, modern accounting made SEO managers’ budgetary excesses visible to their superiors.
66 This 
instilled appreciation for economic reality, and undercut lobbying for expanded subsidies.  
Second, the worst SEO money drains was evident, raising political pressure to privatize them. SEO 
balance sheets also gave politicians book values, reflecting past subsidies to each. These were substantial, 
and the prospect of recovering these amounts through privatizations seemed increasingly attractive.  
Third, dissenting voices reiterated that SOEs were intended to pull the whole economy towards 
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comprehensive modernization, with gains in some offsetting losses in others.
67 Some of this was likely 
disingenuous, for at least some sectors should have posted gains. But the crisis made SOEs justify 
benefits against realistic cost assessments, including opportunity costs recoverable via privatizations.  
  A few SOEs escaped the mass privatization – military suppliers, mints, government printing, 
railways, postal services, and telegraphs. But military suppliers judged obsolete or unimportant were 
privatized, and private railways and military suppliers displaced SOEs as subsidies ended and SEOs sold 
off plant and equipment. With few exceptions, SOEs were on the block.  
 
4.3   Mass Privatization  
The state privatized twenty-six large SOEs by 1896. The model was the Takashima mine, nationalized in 
1874, then sold to its manager, the merchant and Meiji politician Shojiro Goto, in 1875. Goto financed the 
deal, essentially a management buy-out (MBO), with debt, including a loan from the British firm Jardine, 
Matheson.
68 Production rose, but earnings struggled to cover hefty interest costs. Still, the government 
paid $400,000 to nationalize the mine and got ¥550,000 privatizing it less than a year later, netting 
¥190,000 at prevailing exchange rates.
69 Repeating this with other SOEs promised fiscal salvation.  
The first mass privatization attempt was an 1880 law offering fourteen money-losing SOEs at gross 
book value (book value with no depreciation allowance) to buyers screened by officials for financial 
resources – though not ability or expertise! Unsurprisingly, virtually no buyers appeared.  
Under escalating fiscal pressure, and reluctantly conceding that most SOEs were not worth their gross 
book values, the government passed another privatization law in 1884, offering profitable state-owned 
mines to the highest bidder.  
Japan’s major private mining business remained aloof. The Sumitomo ran the Besshi copper mines 
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for the Tokugawa, and the Meiji government confiscated these as state property in 1868. Soon realizing 
they needed Sumitomo expertise to operate the mines, the government reversed itself a month later. But 
Sumitomo’s general manager, Saihei Hirose, distrusted the government and bid for no SOEs in this or 
subsequent privatization rounds. His only reaction was to hire expert engineers away from former SOEs.  
In contrast, Mitsui, bid enthusiastically in every major privatization round. Its major purchases were 
the Shinmachi and Tomioka silk textiles mills, bought in 1887 and 1893, respectively. 
The Iwasaki too entered the fray. Shojiro Goto was struggling to keep Japan’s first privatized SEO, 
the Takashima mine, out of bankruptcy. Yataro Iwasaki once worked under Goto, but showed no interest 
until an elaborate sales contract was drafted in 1881 by the Meiji statesman Yukichi Fukuzawa.
70 The 
contract imposed strict financial conditions on the departing Goto, but gave Mitsubishi clear title after a 
one-time payment terminating the mine’s debts.
71 Mitsubishi paid ¥859,636.45, ¥259,636.45 to the state 
and ¥600,000 to Takashima’s creditors. Iwasaki saw the mine’s remaining reserves and salvage value as 
marginal, but apparently sought political capital by rescuing Goto.
72  
He imposed modern accounting and management, radical changes after Goto’s chaotic governance. In 
1882, he fired three miners for sleeping on the job, presaging sweeping layoffs at the overstaffed mine.  
Iwasaki found a colliery useful, for Mitsubishi’s “national champion” status hinged on shipping, 
which required coal. Mitsubishi could also export coal in otherwise empty freighters during low-volume 
winter seasons and exploit supply shortfalls in Shanghai. Most importantly, Takashima gave Mitsubishi 
expertise applicable in other mines.  
Mitsubishi acquired twenty more coal mines from 1884 through 1911. Eleven were large-scale 
operations that compensated for Takashima’s falling output. The expertise developed at Takashima 
proved invaluable, for coal was essential to Japan’s rising chemical and heavy industries, positioning 
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Mitsubishi well to retain its “national champion” status and attendant political influence.  
But, perhaps unsurprisingly, being a “national champion” ultimately became a liability. By the late 
1870s, rival politicians took to attacking Mitsubishi for manipulating shipping and passenger fares. After 
two major Mitsubishi supporters, Toshimichi Okubo and Shigenobu Okuma, retired, more politicians 
attacked Mitsubishi for redirecting shipping subsidies to other businesses.
73  
In 1882, the government ordered Mitsubishi to restrict itself to shipping or forego further subsidies. 
Sensing an opportunity, the Mitsui had organized a maritime shipping firm, Kyodo Unyu Kaisha, with 
military personnel as CEO and vice-CEO. Generous subsidies let Kyodo Unyu cut sharply into 
Mitsubishi's shipping revenues, which fell from ¥4.6 M in 1881 to only ¥2.3 M by 1883. Kyodo Unyu 
had 29 ships with a 28,010 ton total capacity by 1881, rivaling Mitsubishi's 29 ships and 36,599 ton 
capacity.
74 Iwaskai and the Mitsui appreciated the merits of cooperation, and merged their shipping lines 
in 1885 to form Nippon Yusen Kaisha, renamed Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK).
75 The merger 
also let Mitsubishi remain in mining and diversify further.  
Mitsubishi developed ship maintenance, shipbuilding and iron production in Yokohama, its primary 
port. These facilities were gargantuan, with 1882 sales revenue of ¥187,338, assets of ¥119, 986, and over 
a hundred thousand employees.
76 In 1887, Mitsubishi bought another major SOE, Nagasaki Shipyards, 
which it operated at the government’s request since 1884. Citing the increasingly vociferous political 
attacks on Mitsubishi, Kobayashi suggests the lease and subsequent purchase of the money-losing 
Nagasaki Shipyard were forced upon Mitsubishi to weaken the Iwasaki.
77 If so, they quickly turned the 
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tables, massively expanding and modernizing the shipyard and restaffing it with graduates of Japan’s new 
engineering universities and others with modern training. Mitsubishi transformed the money-losing SOE 
into Japan’s premier ship building facility. By 1895, Nagasaki Shipyard was the undisputed industry 
leader, having built Japan’s first government-standard rank 1,392-ton ocean liner, the Suma. 
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
Table 1 provides details of the Meiji mass privatization, listing the most important SOEs divested, 
details of the transactions, and both the immediate and ultimate buyers.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
For the most part, the Meiji government’s burnt fingers kept its hand out of the economy in 
subsequent decades.
78 After the mass privatization, Japan established only one new state-owned enterprise 
– Yawata Steel – in 1901, and Figure 1 shows subsidies to business remaining small until World War II 
blurred the lines between the military and industry. This fiscal probity let Japan return to bond markets 
when necessary to sustain government spending and refinance old debts. The government raised ¥45M 
from 1884 through 1889, and floated a ¥175M sequenced issue from 1886 through 1897.  
 
5.   Zaibatsu Big Pushes 
The Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and other wealthy families, despite ongoing earnings from traditional businesses, 
lacked capital to buy more than a few SOEs. This handful whet their appetites for profit opportunities 
                                                                                                                                                             
industrialization and privatization of government enterprises (Nihon no kogyoka to kangyo haraisage) (in Japanese) (Tokyo: 
Toyo Keizai, 1977).  
78 Hidemasa Morikawa, Zaibatsu: the rise and fall of family enterprise groups in Japan, (Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 
1992) p. 57 writes “:  "During the first twenty years of Meiji rule, the government had intervened to support industrialization in 
the private sector by encouraging the spread of the company system and the accumulation of capital by entrepreneurs.  By the 
1890s, however, the state had cut back on its direct role in the economy, giving way to private corporations.”    24
further afield; but seizing these would require pooling capital with outsiders, risking the dishonor of the 
Shimomura and Ohmura.  
 
5.1   Pyramidal Business Groups 
Fortunately, a solution presented itself – the “pyramidal business group”. This structure, apparently 
devised earlier in the 19
th century by British trading firms, let a wealthy family (or individual) use public 
investor’ money to control corporate assets worth vastly more than its own wealth.
79 By the late 19
th 
century, pyramids existed in the United States, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere. By the 1920s, they were a 
preferred structure for big businesses throughout the world.
80 
The Japanese variant of the pyramidal business group is called a zaibatsu.
81 As elsewhere, zaibatsu 
were multi-tiered structures with a lead business at the apex. Figure 3 illustrates. The apex firm holds 
equity control blocks in a first tier of listed companies. Each of these, in turn, holds control blocks in a 
second tier of listed firms. Each of these, in turn, holds control blocks yet other listed firms. In each tier, 
public investors own all remaining shares in each firm.  
 
[Figure 3 about here]  
 
Pyramids have several advantages.
82 First, by controlling the apex firm, a wealthy family controls 
essentially limitless tiers of listed firms. The apex firm controls 51% of the votes in every first tier firm, 
and so appoints whomsoever it pleases, usually family members, to their boards. These firms control 51% 
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of each second tier firm, so the latter’s boards are appointed by the boards of the former, who are 
appointed by the family. In this manner, the family controls every firm in the pyramidal group.  
Second, the apex firm’s controlling shareholder needs only a modest fortune because the pyramidal 
business group is mainly financed by public investors. The listed firms in the first tier are 49% financed 
by outside shareholders. Those in the second are 49% directly financed by outside shareholders and 51% 
financed by first tier firms, which are also 49% financed by outside shareholders. The net result is that 
second tier firms are 74% financed by outside shareholders. Firms in the third tier are 85.25% financed by 
outside shareholders, and those in the fourth tier are 92.25% financed by outside shareholders. Lower tier 
firms are successively more thoroughly financed by public shareholders.
83 Despite this, every firm is still 
controlled by the apex firm’s controlling shareholder. Berle and Means stress this stark separation of 
ownership from control in pyramids, and argue that it induces seriously suboptimal management.
84  
Third, pyramids magnify the political and economic clout of the controlling shareholder.
85 Wealthy 
families controlled most zaibatsu. A few, like the Nissan zaibatsu had widely held apex firms. But 
Aikawa and his family controlled Nissan’s board, so here too pyramiding magnified a family’s power.  
Fourth, existing firms’ earnings can finance control blocks in new firms. The controlling shareholder 
needs no additional funds to control new firms created in existing or new lower tiers of the group.
86  
Finally, the family is protected from lawsuits. Each firm is separately incorporated and listed. Each 
has distinct shareholders. And multiple layers of limited liability shield the controlling shareholder from 
legal problems afflicting lower tier firms. 
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In most ways, zaibatsu resembled pyramidal groups in other countries, and Japanese academics call 
pyramidal groups elsewhere zaibatsu. However, some peculiarities merit note. Most zaibatsu owned land 
and mines, initially (Sumitomo) or following the mass privatization (Mitsui and Mitsubishi). Mines, 
especially, were cash cows that financed control stakes in new subsidiaries. Also, zaibatsu had sogo-
shosha, or general trading companies. Through these, zaibatsu bought and sold all goods, gleaning market 
information to guide entry into new industries. Sogo-shosha also served as de facto banks, with trade 
credit replacing loans. This helps explain a third peculiarity, aversion to debt.  
These characteristics combine to facilitate big push growth. One controlling shareholder controls all 
group firms, can make customers and suppliers grow in tandem, and can siphon money between firms as 
needed.  National savings is tapped on a huge scale, since the group is predominantly financed with 
public equity issues. The controlling shareholder has an interest in the profitability of the entire group, 
and in laws and regulations that benefit the economy overall.  And the group can finance ventures into 
new industries using the retained earnings of existing group firms.   Thus, we propose that Japan’s   
zaibatsu, its pyramidal business groups, decided to take over direction of Japan’s ‘big push’ – not because 
the government asked them to, but because the government had withdrawn its hand and each zaibatsu 
could now tunnel earnings from one industry into profitable investments in others. Each zaibatsu, quite 
likely acting alone and for profit, thus did precisely what Rosenstein-Rodan ask of the State.
87      
 
5.2 The  Mitsui  Pyramid 
The Mitsui constructed Japan’s first zaibatsu. Whether they devised pyramiding independently or 
imitated foreign pyramids is unclear. The group began in 1876 when Mitsui Bank, then the Family 
Council’s control center, divested Mitsui Bussan. Since the bank’s owners bore unlimited liability, it 
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avoided risky high return ventures. These Mitsui Bussan undertook. To protect the bank, Takenosuke and 
Yonosuke Mitsui, representing two major Mitsui clans, legally renounced their birthrights and were 
formally cast out by the family. Takenosuke and Yonosuke assumed ownership of Mitsui Bussan, which 
funneled Mitsui money into various risky ventures, including maritime shipping.  
This limited the family’s downside, absent formal limited liability. A contract specified Mitsui Bank’s 
limited liability for Mitsui Bussan obligations, obligations of each to the family should the other fail, 
salaries Mitsui Bank paid Takenosuke and Yonosuke, and that Mitsui Bank controlled Mitsui Bussan.  
This finely crafted document let Mitsui Bussan take risks intolerable to other families, and earn fat 
commissions shipping coal from the state-owned Miike mine to politically volatile China, gaining 
political capital by fattening state coffers. The Mitsui repeated this separation of ownership from control 
wherever a business grew risky. Thus, when Japanese clothing sales flagged in 1873, the silk clothing 
store was transferred to the newly created Mitsukoshi, owned by distant relatives. Again, a contract 
established Mitsui Bank’s control over Mitsukoshi and limited the bank’s liability. In each case, one 
Mitsui firm controlled another without owning it. Thus, some date the formation of the Mitsui zaibatsu to 
1876.
88 The Sumitomo followed suit with similar structures shielding family wealth from downside risk.  
After much trial and error, civil and commercial codes were announced in 1880, though implemented 
much later. A Civil Code passed in 1888, and the Company Law Section of the first Commercial Code in 
1893. These formalized limited liability, rendering controlled subsidiaries unnecessary to block liability. 
Yonosuke and Takenosuke Mitsui quickly revised their birth certificates to restore their Mitsui lineage, 
and Mitsui Bank assumed ownership of Mitsui Bussan and Mitsukoshi. But Japanese controlling 
shareholders were now used to separating their businesses into distinct companies.   
By the late 1890s, after several additional legal reforms, the Mitsui group began to tap public equity.  
Although most Mitsui businesses remained unlisted, the Mitsui Partnership, the group’s apex firm, 
through the Mitsui Bank, held control blocks in Oji Paper and Kanegafuchi Boseki (Kanebo) Textiles, 
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with public shareholders owning the remaining shares.
89   
Mitsui mines were cash cows – producing earnings the Family Council could redirect into other 
companies as they diversified from silk business into banking, which provided financial services to their 
customers and suppliers; electrical equipment, which their modernized mills required; and then other 
more diverse industries that became relevant as Japan’s growth accelerated. This succession reflects 
precisely the industry complementarities envisioned in the big push.
90  
This developing pyramidal structure let Mitsui organize new joint stock companies to expand into 
additional lines of business from the late 1890s through the early 1920s. Soon, most Mitsui firms were 
listed, for promising investments outpaced the family’s wealth, necessitating public equity issues. But all 
firms in the group remained under Mitsui Partnership control, directly or indirectly. The family’s actual 
ownership, though, varied. Figure 3 depicts the zaibatsu in 1914.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Mitsui Partnership retains full ownership of three of the four first tier firms through 1921, but reduces 
its stake in the rapidly growing Mitsui Bank from 100% to 67.2%, even as the book value of its holdings 
rises from ¥20M to almost ¥43.6 M. The expansion is thus predominantly financed with public shares.  
Figure 3 groups remaining firms into affiliates, second tier firms, and related firms, located in lower 
tiers. Again, substantial public equity infusions erode the family’s percentage stakes even as their value 
rises. Thus, the book value of family holdings in Oji Paper rose from ¥4.35 M in 1914 to ¥5.23 in 1921, 
while its ownership stake dropped from72.5% to 31.6%.  
The increasingly complex pyramidal structure, with more tiers of controlled listed firms, let the 
Mitsui reposition firms to their advantage. Morikawa argues that higher tier firms attracted greater family 
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“concern”, and hence posted higher profitability and lower risk.
91 But, key firms in low levels belie this. 
Mitsukoshi, heir to the ancestral silk business, moved to a low tier after its 1904 transformation into a 
department store chain. Oji Paper and Kanebo, firms of national prominence, also placed in low tiers; as 
did Shibura Engineering Works, which merged with Tokyo Electric to form Tokyo Shibura (Toshiba) 
Electric in 1939.
92 General Electric confirmed Shibura’s importance when it bought a 25 to 30% stake in 
1904 for technology licensing.  
It seems plausible that firms were positioned to maximize the family’s returns, while minimizing its 
risk. Putting highly profitable low risk firms in the top tier accomplishes this, Korean pyramidal group 
restructurings in the late 20
th rearranged firms at prices favorable to controlling families, so changes in 
zaibatsu structures might be similarly motivated.
93 However, firms might also be repositioned to facilitate 
tunneling – to facilitate big push growth, to concentrate net profits in firms owned directly by the family, 
or both. This too is consistent with superior performance of firms higher in the pyramid, and the location 
of many clearly important firms in lower tiers.
94    
Records attest that Mitsui Partnership carefully considered which firms to place where, and what 
stake each should hold in others. As the zaibatsu grew more complex from 1912 to 1930, lower tiers were 
periodically restructured, but the upper tier changed little. Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Bussan, Mitsui Mining 
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and Toshin Warehousing remained Mitsui Partnership direct subsidiaries.
95 The only significant change 
added Mitsui Life Insurance and Mitsui Trust Bank to the first tier after 1912.
96  
Mitsui’s intensive diversification began with Mitsui Mining’s entry into chemicals in the early 1910s. 
The Mitsui textiles business needed dyes, and a Mitsui chemicals firm grew apace with the textiles 
operation. Mitsui Bussan founded a shipbuilding firm in 1917 to complement its export business, bought 
steel mill in 1924 to supply its ship building and electrical equipment operations, and established Toyo 
Rayon to enter artificial fibers. This coordinated diversification wave occurred exclusively through new 
subsidiaries of Mitsui Mining, Mitsui Bank and Mitsui Bussan, or new subsidiaries of subsidiaries.  
The growth of the Mitsui zaibatsu seems consistent with a privately orchestrated big push enabled by 
the increasingly active public equity markets. The state declared many of these industries priorities, but 
subsidies were now checked by legislators’ reluctance to undermine public finances again.  
Instead, the Mitsui turned to equity markets. Statutes precisely defining the nature of a business 
corporation and the rights and liabilities of its shareholders made stocks and bonds viable ways for people 
to save. The Mitsui responded to each such legal reform with more share issues, increasingly using public 
equity issues as necessary to expand existing firms or enter new industries.
97 By 1909, most Mitsui 
subsidiaries were listed.  
Older upper tier subsidiaries – Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Bussan, or Mitsui Mining – typically controlled 
newer high-growth companies, which drew on public equity (and some debt). Thus, earnings from Mitsui 
Mining and Mitsui Bussan helped capitalize high growth subsidiaries in chemicals, machinery, 
shipbuilding and maritime shipping. These ventures fulfilled government development plans, but public 
share issues, not subsidies, funded their growth. In contrast, Mitsui's ancestral silk business, now the 
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financially staid Mitsukoshi Department Stores, controlled no major subsidiaries and sat quietly in a 
lower tier. Mitsui’s pyramidal structure seemed generally consistent with Mitsui Partnership channeling 
earnings and public savings into high growth industries, consistent with a big push.  
 
5.3   The Great Pyramids of Japan 
The Mitsui zaibatsu was the first great Japanese pyramidal business group. The others, the Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, and Nissan zaibatsu, grew similarly, and ended up with similar structures. These expansions 
also accord with zaibatsu head offices supplanting the state in coordinating big push growth. 
 
The Mitsubishi Pyramid 
Mitsubishi, of course, kept the best double entry accounting records. These let us see big push 
coordination in action. Each operating unit had to remit its annual profits less depreciation to the head 
office, for reallocation.
98  From 1897, two percent daily interest on excess working capital due the 
partnership insured timely compliance. 
The partnership distributed these profits across the group to cover losses at weaker firms and finance 
expansions at firms with growth opportunities. The head office thus devolved management but controlled 
operating and investment budgets at each location. This let it orchestrate the growth of each business so as 
to maximize the Iwasaki family’s returns as the zaibatsu expanded.  One exception to this, the Mitsubishi 
Bank, acquired in 1895, remitted only one tenth of its profits, and so served as a second earnings reservoir 
for the group. This rendered it more secure in depositors’ eyes, but still let the Iwasaki allocate lending by 
dint of their controlling equity block.  
Distant Iwasaki relatives held “income shares”, and enthusiastically used their dividends establish 
new companies. This practice developed so the Iwasaki could operate other businesses while Mitsubishi 
obeyed a one-time state edict to focus on shipping or forego subsides. The practice outlived the edict, and 
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Iwasaki relatives formed Meiji Life Insurance, Asahi Glass, Kirin Beer and other ventures that built up 
the pyramid. These were managed independently, but remained dependent on head office capital.  
The head office relied on operating unit managers for information about viable investment 
opportunities.
99 Devolving capital budgeting to these mangers therefore seemed reasonable. Thus, from 
1909 on, the minerals mining operation followed the bank’s lead and retained 90% of its profits. Other 
mining, shipbuilding, and sales operations followed in 1911; and the real estate operating unit went a step 
further, remitting only 6% of its profits.  
Earnings merely accumulated in many profitable operating units, so the head office soon widely 
reinstituted full remission. Thus, the minerals mining operation, after retaining ¥1.65 million in 1911, 
resumed full remissions in 1912. The coal mining unit's ¥1 million retention in 1913 likewise triggered 
restoration of the old rule. These ventures served Mitsubishi better as profit centers, for growth 
opportunities lay elsewhere. This failed experiment in investment devolution highlights the head office’s 
coordinating function – the role of big push planners.  
The shipbuilding operating unit, in contrast, continued retaining 90% of its earnings despite 
accumulating over ¥1 million in a single year. Presumably the head office felt the operating unit had 
viable growth opportunities.  
Mitsubishi fully modernized accounting procedures throughout all operations at this time. Operating 
units consolidated balance sheets and income statements for each location and passed the information to 
Mitsubishi Limited Partnership. The head office then set retention levels, borrowing, and capital budgets 
for each operating unit. This let the operating unit managers finance investments directly related to their 
own operations, but also let the head office coordinate the growth of the different operating units and 
finance diversification into new industries.  
Thus, Mitsubishi’s growth, formerly financed with state subsidies, now drew mainly on retained 
                                                 
99 Hidemasa Morikawa, Zaibatsu: the rise and fall of family enterprise groups in Japan, (Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 
1992) p. 105 notes that “the survey of salaried managers during the formative period of the zaibatsu leaves the strong impression 
that such managers were highly oriented to national goals and relatively well educated.  Graduates of Tokyo Imperial University 
and Keio Gijuku University were especially enormous.  Their education had prepared them to seek as businessman to enhance 
their country's place in the world.”  Such broadmindedness would perhaps help group firm managers accept decisions detrimental 
to their firm, but beneficial to the overall group.      33
earnings. Profitable operating units with growth opportunities financed their own expansion. Growth 
elsewhere depended on Mitsubishi Bank loans and earnings redeployed by the head office. After World 
War I, coal mining and shipbuilding profits financed major expansions in iron works, shipbuilding and 
banking. The highly profitable mining operating units, especially, had scant growth opportunities of their 
own. Very occasionally, especially when head office profits were low, Iwasaki family money was also 
plowed back into Mitsubishi.  
But expansion was still financed internally, or with bank depositors’ money. Internal funds proved 
insufficient to finance the burgeoning growth of the 1920s. Mitsubishi Mining was the first to list in 1920, 
raising ¥14.84 at its initial public offering (IPO). One by one, other Mitsubishi operating units listed, and 
started issuing more shares to fund growth. Mitsubishi share offerings raised a total of about ¥45 million 
from1920 to 1931.
100 Further offerings in the early 1940s brought in many times more. These offerings 
often entailed an established firm listing, and then using the funds raised to finance new subsidiaries 
rather than growth in its own operations. For example, the first major Mitsubishi listing, Mitsubishi 
Mining, had more sufficient earnings to cover its own investment needs.  
From the early 1920s on, these equity issues steadily diluted the Mitsubishi Limited Partnership’s 
equity stakes in its listed operating subsidiaries – from an average of 85.5% in 1921 to only 69% by 
1928.
101 To stem this dilution, these subsidiaries took to financing growth by issuing shares in their own 
subsidiaries, rather than issuing more of their own shares. Thus, by 1928, the Mitsubishi group had a 
standard pyramidal structure. 
Mitsubishi firms’ bank debts shrank rapidly, disappearing by 1928. Mitsubishi Bank’s 1929 IPO 
raised ¥13.72 million, and a subsequent seasoned offering raised another ¥5.87 million. The Mitsubishi 
Bank now lent mainly to unrelated firms, and thus held a highly diversified loans portfolio that helped it 
survive the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake and the Great Depression. A few Mitsubishi companies issued 
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bonds, though.
102 Other groups, like the Suzuki zaibatsu, which relied mainly on their banks rather than 
equity issues, generally did not survive those crises.
103  
 
The Sumitomo Pyramid  
The Sumitomo eschewed the Meiji mass privatization, and diversified more slowly than the Mitsui or 
Mitsubishi. Sumitomo accumulated profits from its Besshi copper mine, but its manager, Saihei Hirose, 
opposed diversifying into banking. Sumitomo Bank was established only in 1895, after his departure. 
Nevertheless, it grew rapidly through the early 1900s, soon eclipsing Mitsubishi Bank.  
Sumitomo diversification likewise lagged, as did issuing shares. Sumitomo let the others test the 
pyramidal group model first, and then moved quite quickly. Like the others, Sumitomo diversified first 
into businesses complementary to mining, its core business, and then more broadly. Sumitomo acquired 
several distressed firms during Japan’s deep post World War I recession.
104 Some of this diversification 
seems opportunistic. For example, the Sumitomo took over Japan-US Sheet Glass, a troubled Mitsubishi 
joint venture, in 1922 and replaced all its managers. The rechristened Nippon Sheet Glass prospered and, 
by 1930, essentially monopolized Japan's flat glass market along with Mitsubishi's Asahi Glass.  
But the diversification’s thrust was entry into industries complementary to existing operations. The 
Sumitomo expanded from copper mining to large-scale bulk copper and wire production; and from iron 
and coal mining into large-scale iron and steel production. Increasingly sophisticated business dealings 
required commensurate banking services, so the family established Sumitomo Trust Bank in 1926. 
Shipping and storing valuable metals and metal products required insurance, so they acquired Hinode Life 
in 1925 and Fuso Marine Fire and Casualty in 1930. Large-scale coal mines were better sustained if coal 
had alternate uses, so Sumitomo Chemicals ventured into ammonia/nitrogen fertilizer production at new 
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coal-based chemicals plants in 1928.  
The Sumitomo’s inexhaustible cash cow, the Besshi Copper Mine, continued yielding healthy profits, 
but Mitsui and Mitsubishi mining operations both generated nearly twice its profits by 1909. While 
Sumitomo Bank grew to rival Mitsubishi Bank, Sumitomo’s overall diversification lagged, and its 
businesses remained smaller in scale than their Mitsui and Mitsubishi peers through the early 1900s. The 
first Sumitomo listing was Sumitomo Fertilizer in 1934, when the family finally came to terms with 
the need to tap public equity markets to diversify further.
105 From this point on, the Sumitomo 
diversified more energetically with rapid-fire share issuances.
106  
 
The Nissan Pyramid 
The fourth of Japan’s great zaibatsu, Nissan, has a different provenance. The Mitsui and Sumitomo 
pyramids grew from old family wealth. Mitsubishi grew with the newly wealthy Iwasaki family. Nissan, 
in contrast, was built entirely with public shareholder wealth virtually from its outset – perhaps because 
the pyramidal model was already proved when Nissan, the youngest of the four, was conceived. 
Nissan was formed by the initially impecunious Husanosuke Kuhara and his brother-in-law, 
Yoshisuke Aikawa. By 1919, Kuhara controlled 30% of Japan’s copper mines, 40% of its gold mines, and 
50% of its silver mines; all financed with a ¥2.4 million IPO to capitalize his Kuhara Mining. Japan 
prospered during World War I, but subsequent downturns weakened Kuhara Mining and ultimately 
bankrupted its subsidiary, Kuhara Trading. The ailing Kuhara retired, leaving Aikawa in charge. An 
engineer with state-of-the-art iron US training, Aikawa successfully steered his much smaller Tobata Cast 
Iron through the economic turmoil. To save Kuhara Mining, he pooled his money with that of relatives, 
managers, and outsiders to inject over ¥25 million into that company. Against all expectations, he saved 
Kuhara, became a director in 1926, and then became president. To restore the firm’s long-term health, 
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Aikawa needed capital. In 1928 he issued shares in a new holding company, Nippon Sangyo (Nissan) and 
used the proceeds to capitalize Nippon Mining, which he then merged with Kuhara Mining. Since Kuhara 
was already listed, this left Nippon Mining publicly held, but controlled by the widely held Nissan.  
The older zaibatsu families clearly understood the advantages of public equity, but balanced these 
against privacy and undisputed control. This balance limited public shareholders’ participation, for it 
required unambiguously dominant control blocks throughout the pyramid. The apex firm of the Nissan 
group, in contrast, was widely held, and could issue shares to create new subsidiaries, like Nippon Metal, 
or acquire control blocks in already listed companies.  
Aikawa rapidly built Nissan into a large, diversified zaibatsu, though machinery remained its most 
important business. His technical expertise, still rare in Japan, made him irreplaceable to the group’s core 
profit centers, so Aikawa needed no control blocks.
107 This let Nissan expand rapidly, since equity-
financed mergers and acquisitions (M&A) permitted faster growth than constructing new facilities.
108 
Aikawa preserved Nissan’s technology focus, for its major diversification was into heavy industries, 
chemicals, and electric power. Unafraid of public equity, but averse to debt because of Kuhara’s near 
bankruptcy, Aikawa saw no need for Nissan to control a bank, and kept Nissan firms’ leverage moderate.  
The big push logic underlying the expansion of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo zaibatsu relies 
on circumstantial evidence. But Aikawa makes the logic explicit for Nissan in Figure 3, taken directly 
from his autobiography. Here, Aikawa models Nissan and its directly owned subsidiaries to a plumbing 
system, in which water represents capital.  
 
[Figure 3 about here]  
 
Nissan was listed and Aikawa had to keep its shareholders satisfied. He accomplished this with a 
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slowly rising dividend, flowing through the central pipe of the five extending downwards from his ‘public 
holding company tub’ representing Nissan, the pyramid’s apex firm. The valve in that pipe is turned so as 
to drain the central compartment of that tub, Nissan’s retained earnings, slowly enough that fluctuations 
in its water level never alter its dividend flow into the public capital tub at the bottom of the diagram. 
Nissan’s other two compartments are filled with capital from securities issues (left) and the sale of 
treasury securities (right).  
Nissan’s many operating subsidiaries are represented by the smaller capital tanks across the top of the 
diagram. The level of water in these is kept constant across the subsidiaries by their drainage into a 
common pipeline to Nissan and their own public investors. Note especially the prominent bidirectional 
values on a pipe linking their primary inflow and outflow pipes. By adjusting these, as well as the flow 
directly out of the top of the holding company tub, Aikawa can raise or lower the common level in all the 
subsidiaries. By carefully adjusting the one-way values on the inflow pipes to each, he can prevent 
profitable ones from accumulating capital and less profitable ones from draining empty. A parallel system 
of debt financing pipes tapping water from a financial institutions tub completes the picture.  
Morck and Nakamura correctly note that Figure 3 describes tunneling.
109  But closer inspection 
suggests tunneling to sustain a big push. The plumbing is arranged to keep a constant level of water 
across subsidiary tanks – so those with large investment needs do not run dry and so those with few 
investment needs do not overflow.   Aikawa specifically justifies using overall profits to subsidize losses 
in key firms, and investing in “a few new business lines” that would lose money, but were nonetheless 
“important to the nation” and likely to augment Nissan’s long run financial health.
110 These ventures 
included an auto manufacturing firm, subsequently named Nissan Motor, an Antarctic whaling business, 
and a broadcasting company.
111 This cross-industry and intertemporal subsidization, financed by current 
earnings from a constellation of industries, is precisely what big push development strategists envision.  
                                                 
109 Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, “A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean: A History of Corporate 
Ownership in Japan,” in A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional 
Managers, ed. Randall Morck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
110 Yoshisuke Aikawa, New Capitalism and Holding Companies (Tokyo, Bankers Association, 1934) p. 13. 
111 Udagawa, M. “New Zaibatsu” in  Japanese Zaibatsu ed. S. Yasuoka (Tokyo: Nikkei, 1976) pp.134 and 142.    38
As Nissan grew, Aikawa carefully structured voting blocks and crossholdings so every listed 
subsidiary was unambiguously controlled by other group firms. This was presumably necessary because 
big push growth requires firms in some industries at subsidize those in other industries. While this might 
optimize overall gains for the group, as reflected in Nissan’s own share price, shareholders of subsidiaries 
conscripted to provide subsidies might ‘hold up’ the transaction to seize the group’s economic profits.
112 
Wielding a control block let Aikawa marginalize tetchy shareholders under such circumstances.
113  
Nissan’s share price rose steadily through the Great Depression, allowing repeated equity issues to 
finance opportunistic M&A in the bear market of the 1930s. His broad strategy was to buy promising 
firms, develop them as fully owned subsidiaries, and then refloat them via partial IPOs. In creating these 
spin-offs, or bunshin kaisha, Nissan resembled modern US private equity firms.
114 However, the latter 
usually sell all their shares to the public to raise funds for the next venture, while Nissan always retained a 
control block, using further IPOs to extend the pyramid. This let Aikawa channel earnings from across the 
widely diversified group back to Nissan, and thence to other group firms.  
Aikawa constantly recognized his duty to keep Nissan’s dividends on track, so other listed group 
firms were managed to benefit the apex firm.
115 To Aikawa, this mandated broad group diversification to 
provide Nissan low-risk cash inflows. Subsidiaries in many industries meant a downturn in one was likely 
to be offset by an upturn in another. When the government began accumulating gold in 1932, Nissan sold 
Nippon Mining shares and used the proceeds to diversify further. By 1937, the group included Nippon 
Mining, Hitachi, Ltd., Hitachi Power, Nissan Motor and numerous other large manufacturers and utilities.  
Nissan grew rapidly, surpassing Sumitomo as the third largest zaibatsu by the 1930s; and its apex 
holding company grew successively more widely held. Its shareholder base rose from 20,000 in 1934 to 
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51,804 in May 1937. Although 98% of the latter held fewer than 500 shares, these small investors 
collectively owned over 50% of the Nissan’s equity. Only 33 shareholders owned over 10,000 shares, and 
the Aikawa family’s combined stake totaled only 5.2% in 1937.
116  
Nissan's listed subsidiaries prospered on average, further enriching both Nissan’s shareholders and 
their own. Listed subsidiaries formed or acquired more lower tier subsidiaries, and the pyramid expanded. 
Nissan's own paid-in capital, ¥5.25 million in 1933, rose to ¥198.37 million in 1937, as its total assets 
soared from ¥91.08 to ¥383.10 million. This mainly reflected the rising value of its direct subsidiaries, for 
Nissan’s stock portfolio rose in value from ¥53.38 to ¥269.92 million over the period.  
 
Lesser Pyramids and Other Structures 
The top four zaibatsu were widely imitated by other families and entrepreneurs.
 117 The chemistry experts 
Shitagu Noguchi, Tomonori Nakano, and Nobuteru Mori modeled their widely held Nichitsu, Nisso, and 
Mori zaibatsu on Nissan. Masatoshi Okochi, an expert in machinery manufacture, constructed the Riken 
zaibatsu, again with a widely held firm at the apex.  
Of prominent merchant families from the Tokugawa era, only the Yasuda clan ultimately joined the 
Mitsui and Sumitomo in constructing significant pyramidal groups. The Yasuda kept to finance, and 
never gained the prominence accorded the other two. Other zaibatsu, imitating Mitsubishi, arose as 
wealthy entrepreneurs sought to establish dynasties. Again, none grew to anything approaching the scale 
and scope of the top four. Finally, zaibatsu were not coextensive with Japan’s business sector. By the 
1920s, Japan’s stock markets were large by world standards.
118 Numerous freestanding firms also traded, 
and professional managers played important roles in many.
119  
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[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
 
5.4   Pyramid Power 
Japan transformed itself from a feudal barter economy into a modern industrial state in one lifetime. 
Figure 5 shows real living standards doubling from 1885 to 1920, and tripling by World War II. Figure 6 
shows a labor force only slightly more concentrated in primary sectors than in Canada or France.  
The Japan that achieved this economic miracle is quite different from the Japan of today. Its financial 
system was market-centered, for equity finance predominated. It entrusted corporate governance to 
powerful families and tycoons, who organized listed firms into pyramidal groups; and likely maximized 
of their own wealth, concentrated in the pyramids’ apex firms. Apex firm value maximization is unlikely 
to coincide with shareholder value maximization in any individual lower tier firm.
120  
But, at least for a time, it perhaps aligned the wealthy families’ and tycoons’ interests with the social 
welfare goal of a successful big push, which requires that industries grow in tandem, with suppliers and 
customers eschewing opportunities to hold each other up and expanding in tandem. This sometimes 
requires one industry to lose money temporarily so another can exploit profitable growth opportunities. 
Pyramidal business groups give the apex firm undisputable control over a large constellation of listed 
subsidiaries, and subsidiaries of subsidiaries, populating many industries. The party in control of the apex 
firm can prevent firms from holding each other up and can coordinate cross-subsidized growth where it 
makes overall financial sense for the group. Whether the controlling shareholder’s interest align precisely 
with those of a central planner selflessly coordinating a big push is a knotty problem. But a degree of 
alignment seems plausible.  
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5.5  The Pyramids’ Curse 
Why did Japan’s big push succeed, while similar programs in Latin America, South Asia, and Africa 
repeatedly fail?
121 We propose that Japan’s unique success occurred because its feudal elite, then its 
reformist government, and finally its zaibatsu families, propitiously bowed out.  
First, Japan’s feudal elite was uniquely marginalized by early Meiji shock therapy. Elsewhere, 
traditional elites, intent on preserving their social and economic dominance, are thought to stifle 
growth.
122  After the failed 1877 Seinan Uprising, Japan’s feudal elite was a spent force.   
 The Meiji state too was propitiously marginalized.  It began a classic big push, subsidizing SOEs in 
all major industries. Standard government failure problems forced a mass privatization to restore 
government finances. Thus burned, the state avoided subsidizing industry or establishing SOEs for 
several decades. This left business largely to itself. Elsewhere, big push programs remain state-directed 
indefinitely, magnifying political rent seeking returns. Rampant government failure, unsurprisingly, 
strangles growth after an initial spurt.
123  
Japan’s  zaibatsu took over the big push, brought it to completion, and then were also abruptly 
marginalized. Economic development stalls when a old money families manipulate the state to entrench 
their status.
124 This could not happen in Japan, for the zaibatsu families were fortuitously sidelined after a 
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couple of decades of rapid growth.  
The military government, which seized power in the 1930s through assassination, blackmail, and 
intimidation, had a surprisingly populist – in some respects, almost socialist – ideology for a fascist 
dictatorship.
125 Coining an expression that echoes through financial history, the military condemned 
zaibatsu families for an unpatriotic “short term focus” on the current earnings and dividends of their apex 
firms.
126 Acting on these “concerns”, the military de facto took control of the investment policies and 
strategic decisions of the country’s great corporations. Whether zaibatsu families were coöpted or 
conscripted is debated, but the military substantially sidelined them.
 127  
The US occupation’s zaibatsu dissolution program completed their marginalization. Justified on 
antitrust grounds, but probably to diffuse zaibatsu families’ political power, the program confiscated the 
families’ shares and intercorporate equity blocks, and sold these into the open market.
128  
Thus, Japan’s zaibatsu families did not become an old-money elite of the sort Haber portrays in Latin 
America.
129 Instead, postwar Japan entrusted the governance of its largest corporations to professional 
managers. The zaibatsu families added momentum to the big push, but then lost their hold.  
Finally, Japan’s unequal treaties kept trade barriers low and precluded foreign investment barriers. 
Much work links elite entrenchment to financial insularity.
130 These treaties empowered foreign courts to 
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apply foreign law to disputes in treaty concession enclaves, demonstrating a spectrum of foreign legal 
systems in action. These working examples let Meiji Japan devise and rapidly implement a modern legal 
system. The structure of a country’s legal system correlated with its financial development and growth.
131 
Japan’s stock markets were large by contemporary standards in the early twentieth century.
132 Openness 
also lets imports and exports, as well as foreign capital, substitute for missing pieces of the domestic 
economy in a big push.
133    
 
6.  Conclusion 
Easterly concedes Japan as exemplifying a successful big push, a government-coordinated expansion of 
interdependent industries that sidesteps hold-up problems.
134 That Japan joined the modern world 
remarkably quickly is clear. The Meiji Restoration took place in 1868, and by the end of World War I 
Japan was an industrial economy on par with much of Europe. But most of its big push was likely not 
government coordinated. 
Rather, Japan’s economic history suggests a big push can succeed under certain circumstances despite 
gloomy evidence to the contrary.
135 Specifically,  
1.  The state gives an initial shove, marginalizing traditional elites, reforming basic institutions, perhaps 
even subsidizing technology imports, and then withdraws its hand. This withdrawal checks 
government failure problems.  
2.  Pyramidal business groups emerge to propel the big push. An undisputed controlling shareholder 
focusing on the apex firm’s value, prevents hold up problems and coordinates cross-industry 
subsidies, as group member firms tap public equity markets to capitalize cascades of subsidiaries 
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spanning all relevant industries. At least to some extent, this echoes what a selfless central planner 
coordinating a big push would do  
3.  The controlling shareholders are marginalized as the big push nears completion. This prevents 
entrenched oligarchy problems from reversing the big push.  
4.  All this is done with limited trade barriers and no barriers against foreign investment.  
If this thesis is valid, Japan offers an alternative big push prescription for today’s emerging economies.  
That Japan’s experience is replicable is unclear. Inefficient SOEs became a political liability in Meiji 
Japan – perhaps because of Confucian expectations that bureaucrats should be honest.
136  Japan’s feudal 
elite, central planners, and zaibatsu families were auspiciously discredited in circumstances difficult to 
replicate elsewhere. Elites, once established, are usually hard to dislodge.
137   
Our big push theory of pyramidal business groups differs from other explanations of pyramidal 
business groups. Business group firms may well let firms coinsure each other to spread risk.
138 Group 
firms may well trust each other to do business in economies where corruption stymies arm’s length 
dealing.
139 Without denying such possibilities, we suggest a broader argument that subsumes them. The 
highly industrially diversified pyramidal structure common to business groups throughout the world 
permits a controlling shareholder to stem hold-up problems and coordinate growth across diverse 
complementary industries, permitting very rapid growth financed by public equity – a big push. 
Further research is clearly needed to test these ideas.  If our thesis is valid, diversification in 
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pyramidal business groups, at least in rapidly growing economies, should do more than spread risks.  
These groups should disproportionately contain firms that would risk hold up problems were they 
freestanding. Cross-subsidization should also balance growth across complementary industries, not just 
enrich controlling shareholders. In contrast, pure risk sharing implies that groups should contain firms 
whose returns are as little correlated as possible.  We welcome further work exploring these issues more 
thoroughly, and hope to pursue them ourselves in subsequent studies.   
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Figure 1. Business Subsidies, 1890 to 1936 












Miyajima (2004).   56
Figure 2. Archetypal Pyramidal Business Group 
An apex firm holds control blocks in a first tier of listed firms, each of which holds control blocks 
in other listed firms, each of which holds control blocks in yet more listed firms. A pyramidal 
structure of this sort can leverage family wealth sufficient to control one firm into effectively 
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Figure 3. The Mitsui Pyramidal Group, 1914  
Controlling corporate shareholder’s control stake is indicated where available. In some cases, 
control is clear but the precise size of the control block is unknown. Related firms were likely 






36% by Mitsui Partnership











  Oji Paper 72.5% by Mitsui Partnership
Shibaura Seisakusho 55.4% by Mitsui Partnership
Sakai Celluloid  75.1% by Mitsui Partnership
Firms controlled by Mitsui Bussan and Mitsui Mining
  Matsushima Coal Mine 33.3% by Mitsui Mining
30.0% by Mitsui Bussan
                                          63.3%  total
Onoda Cement   1.4% total
Firms controlled by Mitsui Bank
  Hokkaido Tanko Kisen 
  Tokyo Marine Fire Insurance 
  Kanebo
  Toshin Warehousing
  Nippon Yusen Kaisha
Teikoku Hotel
(stakes unknown)
Firms controlled by Mitsui Bussan
  Taito Sugar   6.0% stake
  Nippon Match 25.0% stake
Mitsubishi Yubo 60.0% stake
Shanghai Textile   9.9% stake
  Kanebo      0.9% stake
Toyodashiki Looming         n/a
  Osaka Textile  n/a
  Hukui Seiren n/a
  Hibino Anzen Fertilizer n/a
  Ryoto Shipping 100% stake
  Wakamatsu Chikuho n/a Firms controlled by Mitsui Partnership & Mitsui Mining
  Hokkaido Tanko Kisen   6.3% by Mitsui Mining
18.2% by Mitsui Partnership
24.5% total
Related Firms
  Bank of Japan   n/a
  Toa Kogyo 8.0% by Mitsui Partnership
  Chunichi Jitsugyo 3.0% by Mitsui Partnership
  Nichiei Hydro n/a
  Teikoku Theaters 6.3 by Mitsui Partnership
  Inawashiro Hydro n/a
 
 
Source. Constructed using data Yasuoka (1982, pp. 222-223) gathered from the Mitsui Archive.   58
Figure 4. Aikawa’s Diagram of the Nissan Pyramidal Group 
Capital is pumped from the public capital tub at the bottom up to the operating subsidiaries at the 
top – directly, through the Nissan holding company tub in the center, or through the financial 
institutions tub at the lower right. By turning one-way and bidirectional values, Aikawa could 
adjust the level of capital in each operating subsidiary to its needs, subsidizing weak but 




Source. Aikawa, Y. New Capitalism and Holding Companies. Tokyo Bankers Association, 1934.  English translation 
by the authors.  
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Figure 5. Japanese Long Term Economic Growth, 1895 to 1943 
Only real per capita Gross National Product (GNP) is available up to 1930, after which real per 
capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is reported. The difference is that GDP includes economic 
activity by foreign firms within Japan, but excludes activity by Japanese firms abroad. GDP is now 
generally preferred as a measure of economy performance, but was not introduced in most 
countries until well into the 20
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Source: Mitchell (2003).    60
Figure 6. Industrial Structure of the Japanese Economy, 1921 
The fraction of the labor force of the Japanese economy employed in each industrial sector is 
indicated by the shadings in the first bar. For comparison, similar breakdowns are provided for 
Canada, France, Germany, the United States and England (including Wales).  
 







Agriculture, forestry, & fisheries Extractive industries
Manufacturing Construction





 * 1931 census. 
** 1925 census. 
 
Source: Mitchell (2003, 2003a, 2003b).  
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Table 1. The Meiji Mass Privatization Program 
Details of important state-owned enterprises privatized between 1874 and 1896.  











Nov.1874  Takashima Coal Mine  ¥393,848
140 – ¥550,000 Shojiro  Goto  Mitsubishi,  1881  Closed, 1986. 
(Mitsubishi Material) 
 
Phase I privatization 
June 1882  Hiroshima Cotton Spinning 
    54,205
141 –    12,570  Hiroshima Menshi Boseki
Co.  Kaizuka Boseki, 1902   
Jan. 1883  Aburato Coal Mine    48,608  17,192   27,943  Nariteru Shirase  Mitsubishi, 1896*  Closed, 1956 
(Mitsubishi Material) 
Phase II privatization 
 



















Oct. 1884  Nashimotomura Shirorengaishi  –  –     101  Raizo Inaba  –  – 
Aug, 1884  Kosaka Silver Mine   547,476  192,000  273,659  Shosaburo Kuhara  –  (Dowa Kogyo) 
Dec. 1884  Innai Silver Mine   703,093  72,993  108,977  Ichibei Furukawa  Furukawa Kogyo  Closed, 1953 
(Furukawa Kogyo) 
Mar. 1885  Ani Copper Mine  1,673,211  240,772  337,766  Ichibei Furukawa  Furukawa Kogyo  Ani Kozan, 1973 
May 1885  Shinagawa Glass   294,168  66,305   79,950  Katsuzo Nishimura,  
Eiichi Isobe  – Closed,  1892 
June 1885 Daikatsu Makiyama Gold Mine   149,546  98,902  117,142  Sen Abe  Mitsubishi, 1888  Okosawa Kozan, 1972 
Nov. 1886  Aichi Cotton Spinning    58,000  ?  ?  Naoto Shinoda  –  Burned down, 1896 
Dec. 1886  Sapporo Brewry  ?  ?   27,672  Kihachiro Okura  Sapporo Beer, 1887  Sapporo Beer 
May 1887  Shinmachi Textile (Silk)   138,984  ?  141,000
142 Mitsui  Yasushi Asaba, 
Kanebo, 1911  Kanebo Co. 
June 1887  Nagasaki Shipbuilding  1,130,949  459,000  459,000  Mitsubishi  Mitsubishi Heavy Ind.  Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. 
July 1887  Hyogo Shipbuilding   816,139  320,196  188,029  Shozo Kawasaki  Kawasaki Heavy Ind.  Kawasaki Heavy Ind. 
Dec. 1887  Kamaishi Iron Ore  2,376,625  733,122  12,600  Chobei Tanaka  Kamaishi Kozan, 1924 Nippon Steel 
Jan. 1888  Mita Agricultural Tools Mfg.  ?  ?  33,795  Shun Koyasu  Tokyo Kikai Mfg.  Tokyo Kikai Mfg. 
Mar. 1888  Banshu Vineyard    8,000
143 ?  5,477  Shomei  Maeda     
                                                 
140 Nov.1874.  
141 June 1882.  
142 ¥72,000 for factory; ¥69,000 for intangibles.    62
Phase III privatization 
Aug. 1888  Miike Coal Mine   757,060  448,549  4,590,439  Hachiro Sasaki  Mitsui, 1889  Mitsui Coal, 
closed, 1997 
Nov. 1889  Hornai Coal Mine & Railway  2,291,500
144     352,318  Hokkaido Tanko Tetsudo Mitsui, 1889  Hokkaido Tanko 
Kisen, closed, 1989
Mar. 1890  Monbetsu Sugar Beats   258,492
145          994  Kuninari Date  Sapporo Seito, 1895  Closed, 1896 
Sept. 1893  Tomioka Textiles (Silk)   310,000
146 105,000
147    121,460  Mitsui  Katakura Kogyo, 1939 Closed, 1987 
Sept. 1896  Sado Gold Mine  1,419,244  445,250 
Sept. 1896  Ikuno Silver Mine  1,760,866  966,752 
1,600,000
148  Mitsubishi  Mitsubishi Materials  Closed, 1973 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
143 March 1888.  
144 Nov. 1889.  
145 Mar. 1890.  
146 Sept. 1893.  
147 ¥25,000 for the factory plus ¥80,000 for contracted raw silk worms.  
148 Mitsubishi acquired Sado and Ikuno in a package deal worth ¥2,560,926, which also included Osaka Metal Smelting and the Aburato Coal Mine.  
Source. Kobayashi (1977, Table 5-1).  